By Anthony W. Marinello

Wars are often easier to begin than they are to end.

When the current conflict with Iran began, I questioned the wisdom of opening another military front in one of the world’s most strategically sensitive regions. History has repeatedly demonstrated that initiating hostilities is far simpler than controlling what follows. Once blood has been spilled, however, policymakers inherit a new reality. Decisions must be based not on how the war began, but on the strategic conditions that now exist.

Today, the central issue is no longer whether the war should have started. It is whether the present strategy can realistically achieve its objectives.

Iran retains multiple methods of threatening commercial shipping and regional infrastructure. Missiles, drones, naval mines, fast attack craft, and proxy forces allow Tehran to impose costs well below the threshold of conventional invasion. As long as those capabilities remain intact, periodic airstrikes may degrade Iranian military assets, but they are unlikely to eliminate the underlying problem. Military history offers many examples in which air power proved decisive in support of broader campaigns, yet insufficient by itself to impose a durable political settlement.¹

The Strait of Hormuz remains the center of gravity. Roughly one-fifth of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes through this narrow waterway, making it one of the most strategically important maritime chokepoints on Earth.² Even intermittent disruptions ripple through global energy markets, insurance costs, and international trade.

That reality presents an uncomfortable strategic question.

If the United States intends merely to punish Iran periodically for attacks on shipping, then the current approach may continue indefinitely with no decisive outcome. If, however, the objective is to guarantee freedom of navigation through the Strait over the long term, a much larger commitment would likely be required.

Such a campaign would not necessarily imply occupying all of Iran. It could instead focus on establishing lasting control over the maritime approaches to the Strait while denying Iranian forces the ability to threaten commercial traffic. Even that narrower objective, however, would require substantial military resources, long-term political commitment, and acceptance of significant risks. Military operations have a way of expanding beyond their original objectives, and policymakers should never assume otherwise.

Therein lies the dilemma.

Limited military actions often satisfy the political desire to “do something,” yet they may fail to alter the strategic balance. Conversely, decisive military campaigns can achieve clearer military objectives but frequently carry enormous financial, diplomatic, and human costs. There is rarely a low-cost option once major wars begin.

Reasonable people can disagree about which course is preferable. Some will argue for negotiations and deterrence. Others will conclude that only overwhelming force can restore lasting security. Those debates are both legitimate and necessary in a democratic society.

What seems increasingly difficult to defend is the assumption that repeated, limited strikes alone will permanently solve the problem. If the strategic objective is lasting security in the Strait of Hormuz, policymakers should honestly explain how the current approach achieves that end. If it cannot, then the public deserves an equally honest discussion about the alternatives—and their costs.

Wars eventually demand strategic clarity. The longer that clarity is delayed, the more expensive it usually becomes.

Endnotes

1. Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983 [1921]), 25–40.

2. John A. Warden III, *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 1–23.

3. Lawrence Freedman, *Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine* (London: Allen Lane, 2022), 359–410.

4. Élie Tenenbaum and Jean-Christophe Noël, *Fury from the Skies: A Strategic Analysis of the Air Campaign Against Iran*, Focus Stratégique No. 134 (Paris: French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), May 2026), 42–60.

5. Mariel Ferragamo, “The Strait of Hormuz: A U.S.-Iran Maritime Flash Point,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated March 12, 2026.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), Book I, Chapters 1–2.

7. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), 25–89.

8. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Meridian Books, 1991), 321–348.